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Abstract 
 
This study contributes to ongoing attempts by 
scholars to understand the many ways that social 
media is being used by disaster and crisis response 
actors. We present a case study consisting of 
emergency response organizations, government 
agencies, local government, non-government 
organizations, community groups and platform-based 
actors, and focus specifically on how social media is 
used in this context to support the information needs 
of vulnerable groups. We examine how tension 
between the presence of top-down, generic 
information and the need for contextualized and 
specific information is resolved, and the translation 
processes that occur between the range of actors. We 
also offer recommendations for future research to 
address the disproportionate impacts of disasters and 
crises on vulnerable groups. 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years, there has been growing interest in 
the field of research known as ‘crisis informatics’ [1, 
2]. This field combines social science and computing 
knowledge to better understand how organizations 
and people use digital technology to respond to 
disasters and crises [3], such as wildfires, hurricanes, 
and earthquakes. Within the crisis informatics 
research we draw on and contribute to two streams. 
The first focuses on how technology can improve 
inter-organizational collaboration, information 
sharing and other operational areas of response 
efforts [4, 5]. Studies in this stream examine 
emergency response organizations (EROs) such as 
police and fire, government agencies, non-
government organizations (NGOs) and community 
and volunteer groups. Recent research in this stream 
demonstrates how digital technology—in particular 
social media
1—is resulting in porous boundaries 
between these organizations, challenging the 
bureaucratic and top-down logic of coordination and 
information sharing [6-8]. With few exceptions [8], 
little research has sought to understand the evolving 
information landscape of actors such as EROs and 
government agencies (who we refer to as ‘upstream’ 
actors) and informal organizations such as NGOs, 
community groups, local social media networks and 
private/platform-based organizations  (who we refer 
to as ‘downstream’ actors)2, as they seek to access 
and provide information to each other and their 
constituents.  The second stream of research focuses 
on how social media is used by individuals and how 
crowdsourced data is used to inform decision making 
and enhance situational awareness of EROs and 
government agencies [1, 8, 9]. While this research 
has grown significantly, it has neglected the interplay 
of social media and the evolving landscape of 
organizations; in particular, how downstream actors 
use social media to interpret, translate and 
contextualize top-down information as well as to 
provide information to specific audiences. 
We bring these two streams of research together 
to examine how the range of organizations use social 
media to address the concerns of vulnerable 
persons—defined broadly as a group or community 
whose circumstances create challenges to obtaining, 
understanding or seeking information, or to their 
ability to respond in the same way as the general 
population [10]. This framing typically encompasses 
older, disabled, lower socio-economic, isolated and 
marginalized persons [11]. While these groups are 
sidelined in the crisis informatics literature, reports 
and studies demonstrate that they suffer 
disproportionately from disasters and crises [12, 13]. 
                                                          
1
 By social media we refer to Web 2.0 platforms/mobile apps that 
allow for the creation and sharing of user-generated content. 
2
 Upstream and downstream refers to position in the information 
hierarch; whereby information is distributed from the EROs and 
government agencies (upstream) for action, interpretation and 
contextualization by actors downstream. 
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A focus on vulnerable persons is important given the 
frequent pattern of information provision during a 
disaster: typically, upstream actors such as EROs and 
government agencies provide warnings and 
information to the public (the top-down logic), 
information that tends to be generic. This is in 
tension with the often specific information needs and 
technology practices of vulnerable persons [7]. We 
examine how this tension is resolved by community 
groups and NGOs—using social media and other 
means—to provide contextualized content and reach 
out to vulnerable groups. Scholars have called for 
research to focus on the specific information needs 
vulnerable groups as well as how they use social 
media [7].  
We address the research question: In the context 
of disasters and crises, how do actors use social 
media to provide information to vulnerable persons? 
To address this question, we undertake a qualitative 
case study consisting of 28 organizations. Our sample 
includes actors across the spectrum—including 
upstream and downstream response and 
service/information providers involved in the disaster 
preparation, mitigation, response and recovery 
phases.  
We demonstrate how the organizational actors 
adapt generic disaster information and contextualize 
it for vulnerable persons, and the different social 
media strategies used for doing so. At the same time, 
we identify tensions between consistent and reliable 
information, the need for specificity, and the role of 
technology; by doing so we render this tension more 
visible to theorizing. In adding to the literature on 
disaster and crisis response actors [6, 14] we 
highlight the need to take more seriously how this 
kaleidoscopic network can better support the needs of 
vulnerable persons. To address the needs of 
vulnerable persons and develop resilient communities 
it is necessary, we argue, to capture and grasp 
complex interactions between the different 
stakeholders.  
In what follows, we first consider the relevant 
research and focus on three themes that inform our 
study (Section 2). In Section 3 we describe the setting 
of our study and the methods used to collect and 
analyze our data. Section 4 presents our findings. 
Section 5 outlines the key theoretical contributions 
and directions for future research. 
2. Relevant work 
From our review of the literature, three major 
themes inform our study. The first theme deals with 
the network of actors in disaster and crisis response. 
The second covers work related to information 
challenges and the mediating role of digital 
technology. The third relates to addressing the needs 
of vulnerable populations. In the following sub-
sections, we examine the contributions of each 
theme. 
 
2.1 Multilayered and converging actors  
Responding to complex, high-velocity, 
unpredictable, and time-critical incidents requires 
rapid and simultaneous intervention from different 
organizations [14-16]. The possible arrangement of 
organizations, structures, and divisions of tasks are 
traditionally framed as four archetypes [17]. The first 
are ‘established’ organizations, such as the EROs, 
that undertake tasks (e.g. manage fires, close roads), 
or other government agencies involved in managing a 
disaster or crisis as part of their core responsibility 
(e.g. a government department of health or a central 
emergency organization). These organizations are at 
the apex of a bureaucratic or top-down structure [7]. 
Second are ‘expanding’ organizations, which consist 
of a small standing organization and a larger group of 
trained staff/volunteers that can be mobilized. These 
organizations, such as the Red Cross, can expand and 
retract as needed. Third are ‘extending’ organizations 
that perform tasks outside of their traditional role 
(e.g. organizations that supply food, shelter and 
logistical support). Fourth are ‘emergent’ groups, 
such as community groups and volunteers that often 
have fluid memberships that perform non‐regular 
tasks [15]. While established organizations are often 
the lead agency during disaster and crisis, the other 
levels are more dynamic and fill the gaps left by the 
established organizations. In the structure described, 
information is distributed from the established actors 
(i.e. upstream actors) for action, interpretation and 
contextualization by downstream actors.  
 Studies have built on the four-level 
conceptualization of organizational types by 
demonstrating how organizations form clusters to 
collectively coordinate efforts to handle unfolding 
disaster events [14] or how digital technology breaks 
down boundaries between organizations and 
activities [6]. For instance, the Red Cross created the 
Ready2Help platform that matched individuals 
needing help with people who could offer it [6]; other 
examples include crowdsourcing and mapping 
platforms that guide relief efforts. Citizens, 
volunteers and community groups are also leveraging 
digital technologies—social media in particular—to 
address emergent demands and fill localized 
information and support needs [18]. These emergent 
digital networks typically form when a crisis presents 
itself and may develop into stable organizations (e.g. 
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local groups connected by social media). These shifts 
suggest the convergence of organizational boundaries 
and activities as well as the convergence of physical 
and online spaces [6, 8]. While this presents new 
opportunities, it also raises challenges for providing 
effective support, and consistent and relevant 
information. As the number of actors grows, the 
priorities of these actors will overlap: across time 
(e.g. the preparedness, mitigation, response and 
recovery phases); across space in terms of the spatial 
dimension of a disaster; across different stakeholder 
groups; and across information management 
capabilities in terms of acquisition, processing and 
content, sources and dissemination. As the 
interactions and relationships between organizations, 
individuals and technology move away from the 
bureaucratic, top-down logic, they become more 
complex and may result in behavior that is difficult to 
predict [7]. 
  
2.2 Information and digital technology  
Disasters and crises are characterized by several 
types of information challenge that complicate the 
responses of organizations and individuals. For 
instance, the most appropriate channels for 
distributing and sharing information, its format and 
content, and the volume, veracity and timing of 
information [2]. Evidence clearly suggests that the 
quality of information sharing and communication 
can reduce the risk from disasters and support 
recovery [2, 19] and that many disaster related deaths 
may have been saved ‘with better information and 
communication’ [20]. For instance, an investigation 
into heat waves in France concluded that access to 
basic information, such as advice to wrap yourself in 
damp cloths or drink enough cold water, could have 
reduced the death toll amongst the elderly [11]. As 
well as saving lives, information reduces suffering in 
the recovery phase by helping victims to trace lost 
family and friends, to find out what aid they are 
entitled to and where to seek shelter [20]. A 
challenge that remains is a lack of understanding on 
how to frame information [21]; specifically, how 
information and warnings are best provided and the 
ability of humans to interpret information on low-
probability and high-intensity incidents. For instance, 
studies have argued that warnings such as ‘Do Not 
Panic’, ‘Amber Alert’ or ‘Stay/Go’ are confusing and 
do not inform citizens whether they should be 
alarmed or what action they should take [19, 21]. 
Therefore, citizens are faced with the challenges of 
sensemaking and assessing information accuracy 
under dangerous conditions [22]. Increasing the 
volume of warnings also raises the possibility of 
information overload, resulting in citizens neglecting 
critical information or it triggering inappropriate and 
counterproductive responses. This critically includes, 
but is not limited to, delaying responses [21] or 
overreacting and responding to misinformation [23]. 
For our study, research demonstrates that citizens’ 
actions are most strongly predicted when emergency 
communications are received from neighborhood and 
community member sources rather than sources 
detached from the local setting [24], presenting an 
important challenge to the bureaucratic and top-down 
mode of information dissemination. Communities are 
inherently different and need targeted information, 
tailored to the disaster type and community 
composition. In addition, information needs to be 
two-way, so that those at risk in a disaster or crisis 
can provide and receive specific advice about their 
household and what action to take to protect 
themselves and their property [24]. 
To address the foregoing information challenges 
there has been a push towards digital technology such 
as social media (but also mobile/web-based systems) 
for transmitting fast and clear information [25, 26]. 
This has been critical for both disseminating 
information (e.g. coping strategies, precautionary 
advice) and collecting information from at-risk 
populations. There is evidence of social media being 
linked to protective action against a hazard [1] and 
allowing segments of the community that have not 
participated in traditional ways to connect with 
government agencies and EROs [9]. Importantly 
though, this research recognizes that the volume of 
social media data has introduced challenges around 
reliability and veracity of information, thus, 
diminishing peoples' ability to find the information 
needed to organize relief efforts, find help and 
potentially save lives [27, 28]. Some research 
suggests a mismatch between use of social media by 
response organizations and the expectations for their 
use held by the general public [1]. At the 
organizational level this can be explained by 
deficiencies in strategy and training, uncertainty, and 
lack of resources to make meaningful use of social 
media or make sense of the data [28].  
 
2.3 A focus on vulnerable persons  
The foregoing sub-sections point to an increasing 
diversity of actors and a growing role for digital 
technology in disaster contexts, while at the same 
time acknowledging information challenges. 
Typically, academic research that addresses these 
issues treats individuals and communities as 
homogenous [29]. However, post-disaster reports 
across the globe—e.g. from Australian bushfires and 
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earthquake and tsunami in Japan [12, 13]—have 
highlighted the disproportionate number of fatalities 
amongst groups defined as ‘vulnerable’. As noted, 
this category typically encompasses older, disabled, 
lower socio-economic and marginalized persons. 
There are also meta-categories such as lack of access 
to resources or services, isolation, and temporal 
dimensions to vulnerability. Vulnerable persons 
suffer from disasters for a number of reasons, 
including lack of mitigating actions and uninformed 
decision making [30]. This is not limited to the 
immediate threat of a disaster itself. For example, the 
IFRC [20, 30] found that certain groups such as the 
elderly, disabled, widowed, and tenant women endure 
multiple discriminations when attempting to access 
information, relief assistance, and reconstruction 
subsidies. Individuals within these groups often have 
different information behaviors, technology 
availability, or digital literacy and practices, and rely 
heavily on (offline) social networks [11, 24]. 
In terms of institutional responses, despite their 
increased risk, these groups are often given low 
priority and little attention before, during, and after 
disasters, with few government agencies, NGOs or 
guides dedicated specifically to their unique needs 
[30]. Governments and aid agencies often assume 
individuals are looked after by their community or 
family [23] and that mass distribution of information 
will reach them. However, this is not necessarily the 
case and information services such as mobile 
messaging and the Internet may also be disrupted by 
the disaster. Consequently, vulnerable individuals are 
often left to cope alone [20], remain invisible and 
marginalized, and find it hard to obtain humanitarian 
relief, information, and economic and social support 
[20, 30].  
3. Research study 
We undertook a case study examining a range of 
actors involved in providing information and/or 
responding to disasters and crisis in a State of 
Australia. The case is interesting because the State 
implemented the ‘One Source, One Message’ 
paradigm of information dissemination to ensure 
consistent, trusted information and communication. 
The case allows us to pay attention to tensions 
between actors, information flows both upstream and 
downstream, and the translation processes that occur. 
We followed an interpretive case study approach, 
which is well-suited to illuminating the use of 
information systems in organizations [31]. We 
interviewed 43 stakeholders across 28 organizations 
(see Table 1). Drawing on multiple organizations 
allowed us to explore the case from diverse and 
multilayered perspectives [32]. Our sampling 
approach can be defined as purposive as we 
identified actors, predominantly through professional 
networks and online searches; this was then 
complemented by a snowballing technique. A semi-
structured interview schedule was followed which 
focused on the organization’s role, how it shares 
information, the tools it uses (with a focus on social 
media), how it reaches out to specific communities, 
and its inter-organizational information sharing 
approaches and challenges
3
. While most studies are 
framed around a specific incident such as a bushfire, 
hurricane or flood [18, 19], interviewees in our study 
were free to reflect on a range of incidents [33]. 
Interviewees reflected on several disasters that they 
vividly recollected, predominantly bushfires, floods 
and heatwaves. Importantly, the reflections accounted 
for incidents over time, covering multiple instances 
rather than a single snapshot of the study phenomena. 
They referred to a range of vulnerable groups such as 
older persons, socially/geographically isolated 
persons, and refugee/recent migrant communities, as 
well as transient persons such as tourists (an at-risk 
group during bushfires). Interviews were conducted 
face-to-face or over the phone. Most interviews were 
audio-recorded with the permission of the 
interviewee, or comprehensive notes were taken, 
allowing the discussion to be reconstructed 
immediately after the interview.  
 
Table 1. Data collection 
 Org. Example org. No.*  
U
p
strea
m
 
  d
o
w
n
strea
m
 
Gov. 
agencies 
Central organizing agency; 
Fire and Emergency 
Services Authority 
4/10 
EROs  Police; Fire brigade 3/8  
Local 
gov. 
Local councils 5/9 
Comm. 
groups, 
NGOs 
 International NGO; local 
community groups; 
auxiliary response groups  
14/14 
Platform 
org.  
Sharing economy firm, 
not-for-profit 
2/2  
*Number of organizations / interviewees 
In addition to the interviews, study participants 
were forthcoming with numerous additional materials 
regarding their work. Illustrative examples include 
both an NGO and local government disaster guide 
and preparation manual, and ERO and government 
strategic reports. These materials contributed to our 
understanding of organizational strategies and 
procedures.  
                                                          
3 The interview schedule is accessible at https://bit.ly/2Pv1mBU  
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Data collection and analysis were conducted 
simultaneously so understanding could emerge from 
the theoretical concepts and empirical content. The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim and entered into 
NVivo qualitative software for analysis, as were 
notes and memos. In total, 620 pages of qualitative 
data were analyzed. Saturation point was reached 
when no new themes emerged from the data. 
Our coding sequence followed the logic of open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding, and the 
constant comparative method [34]. To ensure a 
systematic and reliable coding process, two authors 
analyzed each transcript; after analysis of each 
transcript we compared and contrasted codes to 
negotiate a consolidated yet evolving code book. 
Through multiple rounds of axial coding we 
identified relationships among the open codes. As our 
analysis developed, we applied selective coding to 
address our research question, focusing more on 
conceptual abstraction (or the ‘story-line’) based on 
our insights into the research [34]. This allowed us to 
manage the volume of data and constantly organize 
codes into a coherent structure. In the analysis 
presented here we rely heavily on interview quotes 
and examples as interpretative evidence; building an 
analytical and explanatory narrative account.  
4. Findings 
Our findings focus on two key aspects relevant to 
our research question: the links and 
interdependencies between the organizations, with a 
focus on information and the role of social media; 
and the dominant strategies and translation processes 
that unfold between the actors. Our sample 
comprised a diverse set of organizations. Table 2, 
based on the analysis of interviews and 
organizational documents summarizes how they 
address the informational needs of vulnerable 
persons, the role of social media in the work of that 
organization, the specificity of information provided, 
and the directional information flow. While the table 
presents the activities of actors as silos, there existed 
clear interdependencies amongst them. Notably, a 
mandated Joint Standard Operating Procedure guided 
hierarchical flow of information from the central 
government actor to EROs, local governments and 
NGOs, which filtered through to community groups.  
it’s about having, you know, one place for people 
to look at for all emergencies…And then it’s 
about actually having a suite of tools for them to 
actually access this information…So, it’s actually 
about having the suite of information or having 
the one place to have incidents published, the 
suite of information to actually get it out there, 
yes, which I know sounds really simplistic 
(GOV2). 
This hierarchy extended to one of the platform-
based actors that had formal strategies in place with 
government actors to provide disaster related 
information to customers. While pointing to a top-
down information hierarchy, more dynamic and two-
way information flows mediated by social media [1] 
also played a significant role. 
social media has to be a part of the 
communication suite that we use. So, yes, it’s 
come a long way. And also from a community 
perspective, you know, there’s an expectation that 
they can contact us and that we will speak to them 
(ERO2). 
 
Table 2 (column 4) indicates that the specificity 
and contextualization of information increased 
amongst the downstream actors, as they followed a 
more organic approach to understanding the 
complexities of community response and needs of 
vulnerable persons: ‘shining a light in dark places 
that government isn’t really interested in’ (NGO1).  
Upstream actors—the EROs and government 
agencies—followed multi-channel approaches to 
information sharing, as mandated in their operating 
procedures. In terms of social media, this included 
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram (with some 
exploration of Chinese-focused social media like 
WeChat), and was complemented by digital 
technology including organizational websites, SMS 
and mobile apps. Platform-based actors relied on 
their platforms for engaging with vulnerable persons. 
One used its platform to match vulnerable persons 
with people that could help. The other distributed 
top-down information to its users and pointed them to 
government sources, following the ‘one source, one 
message’ paradigm: ‘messaging is sent as soon as an 
incident is confirmed and sufficient safety 
information is being updated from local authorities’ 
(PLA1). It also shares this information via Twitter 
and Facebook.  
We typically do not provide such warnings 
(tailored to specific vulnerable groups), our 
messaging includes links to local officials where 
guests and hosts can receive latest updates on the 
situation as it unfolds (PLA1) 
 
NGOs/community organizations predominantly 
relied on Facebook as their information-sharing 
medium and space for networking and connecting. 
For some locally focused community groups 
Facebook was the glue that held them together and 
provided an alternative to traditional top-down 
information [18].  
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Table 2. Focus on vulnerable, social media and information flows 
Org.  Focus on vulnerable 
communities 
How social media is used Specificity of information and  
information flow 
Gov. 
agencies 
Provide information to wider 
community; some provision to 
engage the vulnerable 
specifically. 
Provide guidance and 
information to community; 
engage with the wider 
community; gather intelligence. 
Broad scope, incident specific 
information. Emphasis of flow from 
agency to community. Some flow 
from community to agencies. 
EROs 
 
Provide information to wider 
community; some provision to 
engage the vulnerable 
specifically. 
Provide guidance and 
information to community; 
engage with the wider 
community; gather intelligence. 
Broad scope, incident specific 
information. Emphasis of flow from 
government to ERO to community. 
Some flow from community to 
EROs. 
Local 
gov.  
 
Identify the vulnerable and 
develop suitable 
communication/support 
activities. 
Provide guidance and 
information to community; 
engage with the wider 
community; gather intelligence. 
District- or community-centric. 
Information flow largely from local 
government to community. Some 
flow from community to local 
government. 
Comm. 
groups, 
NGOs 
Utilize local networks and 
connections to identify and 
support community member 
needs, including vulnerable 
persons. 
A forum for sharing of 
information/networking; 
localized intelligence; ‘go to’ 
source of information. 
Local community; combine 
information from official sources 
with localized content; sharing local 
knowledge/information; greater 
multi-directional information flow. 
Platform 
org. 
 
Provide information to wider 
community; connect persons 
that need help. 
Provide guidance and 
information to customers. 
Customer-centric; use largely 
government and ERO content to 
assist customers; or not providing 
guidance or information at all. 
 
Having sketched out the activities and 
interdependencies of organizations we turn to 
examining the strategies and translation processes 
that take place across the organizations in engaging 
with vulnerable groups. Figure 1 (Appendix 1) 
presents a process chart of the information flows as 
derived from the qualitative data. Similar to Adrot 
and Figueiredo [16] it illustrates the intensity of ties, 
with a focus on information. Upstream actors were 
acutely aware of the risk to vulnerable persons and 
had formulated strategies for engaging them.  
Many of those messages are targeted directly to 
vulnerable people. So, people with a disability, 
people caring for children, or elderly people 
(GOV3) 
 
For this reason, there are strong links between 
government agencies and NGOs that work directly 
with vulnerable persons. The NGOs have direct 
access to these groups and undertake community 
engagement—'their resource (a planning guide) for 
engaging with more vulnerable members of the 
community around, so their social preparedness, you 
know, the need to know your neighbours’ (GOV3). 
As noted in Figure 1, upstream actors 
predominantly push out information (as indicated by 
the thickness of the lines; the thinner lines indicate 
the lesser information flows from the downstream 
actors to the government agencies/EROs). Upstream 
actors explained that their internal analysis of how 
their social media content is used shows 
‘intermediaries’ or ‘information brokers’ [35] are 
often an important part of the network as they act as 
information intermediaries for vulnerable persons. 
Therefore, it is a matter of using social media to ‘tie 
into local trusted networks’ (GOV4) and 
understanding where vulnerable persons are 
connected to the community. 
There will be people who have no connection, I 
absolutely accept that, but there will be people 
who are connected into something, and it's just 
understanding what that something is (GOV2) 
 
It may also involve social media campaigns that 
target persons who act as information brokers. For 
example:  
for the heat campaign, we target middle aged 
women, because they are more likely to look after 
young children, as well their elderly parents, who 
are both vulnerable people in heat (GOV2) 
 
This builds on the realization that social media 
content is often shared. As well as direct 
communication, it is used to arm individuals with 
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information that can be relayed (offline) to vulnerable 
persons: ‘a warning post would actually be just 
people notifying each other. And then you’ll see 
comments, oh, ‘tell Mum’, you know’ (LGOV2). 
 
By doing so, upstream actors provide a clear and 
consistent message, while delegating to citizens the 
roles of contextualizing, translating and sharing for 
vulnerable persons. This is critical because, in 
addition to the consistent message, it also helps 
address tensions in framing multiple messages to 
different groups and getting individuals to act on 
them.  
[people] will certainly not align themselves to 
messages that appear to be directed towards 
people with any level of vulnerability or frailty. 
(ERO2) 
 
As noted in Figure 1, downstream actors relied on 
top-down information but adopted different strategies 
in using social media to reach out to their 
constituents, either directly or through co-creation of 
more contextualized information. Three overlapping 
strategies are identified. 
Strategy 1–Contextualizing and sensemaking: As a 
disaster or crisis unfolds, social media spaces act as a 
place for community members to post information 
about environmental signals (e.g. smoke), post photos 
of flooded roads, inaccessible areas or alerts via 
broadcast media, and ask for verification. Thus, 
social media is used for resilience building, self-
coordination and providing help [1]. In addition, local 
community groups often have someone involved in 
the fire service auxiliary that either acts as an 
information gateway between upstream and 
downstream actors or can help with making sense of 
environmental signals. 
There’ll be a Bureau of Meteorology extreme 
weather warning, we’ll (community group) put 
that up (on the social media page) and then that 
usually starts a conversation with the community.  
Then the community will post back on the site, 
images and the community will respond to those 
messages. So, we would be posting the official 
messages but it sort of takes-off from there with 
the community. (COM13)  
 
The sharing of information (as in the quote above) 
acts as a catalyst for offline and online information 
sharing action, whereby information ‘reverberates’ 
(COM8) and the process of translating and making 
sense for vulnerable persons takes place. This 
includes posts about how close a bushfire is to a local 
area, where to find places of refuge, or needing help. 
It may involve tagging someone to act or pass on a 
warning if, for instance, a bushfire is in the vicinity 
of someone known to be vulnerable. Significantly, it 
may trigger offline chains of notification whereby 
one person checks in on another, and so on. This was 
noted as particularly significant for refugees/newly 
arrived migrants, elderly, and disabled persons. 
Strategy 2–Community resilience: This strategy 
considers that vulnerable persons may not be 
reachable through social media. It focuses on using 
social media as a means of making a local 
community aware of at-risk groups, with messages 
used to encourage action and engagement with 
vulnerable persons. This is similar to the approach of 
upstream actors, which involves reaching out to 
intermediaries and informing the community of at-
risk groups: ‘look out for vulnerable, older people in 
the community’ (COM2); ‘educating people about 
disadvantage and about victims in our community’ 
(COM4). Within this strategy, action directed at 
vulnerable persons is often undertaken offline: 
‘Social media for us is more about a broad-brush 
approach. Like more broad community...I think for 
the vulnerable groups we work with, we would use 
other means’ (COM7). This supports the view that 
social media is a complementary rather than 
substitute tool.  
Strategy 3–Reaffirming top-down messages: 
Downstream actors also refrain from providing 
tailored information. That is, while they allow their 
social media spaces to be used as places for 
information sharing, they do not engage in any 
interpretation; instead they prefer to point to top-
down information sources—‘don’t come to us for 
info, we’re not going to give it to you’ (COM5). 
Likewise, a private platform-based actor reported that 
they only provide links to official sources but will 
provide follow-up assistance accommodating the 
language preference of customers by phone, social 
media, or email. This is particularly relevant to 
tourists. One international NGO managed its social 
media strategy at a national level: ‘it’s vanilla…it’s 
not dynamic, it’s not moving, it’s not live, it’s not 
real, which is the actual premise of those platforms’ 
(NGO1). This approach was adopted as previously 
the NGO had ‘a lot of messaging that was 
conflicting—potentially’ (NGO1). However, it used 
its platform to re-affirm the top-down message to 
vulnerable groups that may be out of the periphery of 
upstream actors:  
we’re pretty active about getting messages out 
there to say, you know, look after yourself, 
prepare and have a think about, and just 
grabbing the information from the emergency 
services…pushing that out…using our trusted 
brand to enhance that (NGO1).  
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 While the quote demonstrates a strategy of re-
affirming, the NGO relied on being part of 
community groups on social media via its volunteers. 
A challenge it faced is that its volunteers are not 
‘digital volunteers’ [36]: ‘the volunteers are not that 
type of cohort...they’re not Twitter users’ (NGO1). 
The NGO was aware of the need for specific 
information and is developing strategies to take 
generic information and ‘spice it up a little bit with 
some real-time information’ (NGO1).  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Within the crisis informatics literature, how to 
mobilize a timely response to save lives, minimize 
damage and losses is a key concern. We have 
contributed to this literature by focusing on the 
interplay between different actors [4, 6, 8] and the 
role of social media in delivering information to 
vulnerable persons. We demonstrate how upstream 
actors followed a top-down approach and used social 
media to reach out to information brokers who may 
then engage with vulnerable persons. Downstream 
actors adopted three overlapping strategies: Strategies 
1 and 2 focused on either contextualizing information 
or reaching out to vulnerable persons through 
information brokers, while Strategy 3 focused on 
reaffirming top-down messages for hard-to-reach 
groups (with local action undertaken offline). The 
notion of information brokers has been noted in the 
crisis informatics literature [35]; we build on this by 
showing that they are not only virtual actors but are 
also a trusted intermediary for vulnerable persons.  
As noted in Figure 1, downstream actors rely on 
information from both upstream actors and their 
constituents—meaning that information is spread 
across time, space and perspectives. In addition, 
social media is enacted in different ways at different 
levels [18]. Information is shared, tailored and 
contextualized in an organic way. We see this as a 
process of negotiated meaning, where different parts 
of a network of actors distribute, share, interpret and 
enact information in different and continuously 
evolving ways [37] as a means to deal with 
ambiguity. (We also noted community groups that 
refrained from using social media for this purpose). 
Therefore, we add to the literature that sees disaster 
and crisis response as a complex system composed of 
adapting and self-organizing actors [7]. In our case, 
we see adaptation taking place to meet the needs of 
vulnerable persons. This links to the notion of self-
reliant communities with the skills, knowledge and 
ability to minimize the impacts of hazards. 
As organizations are still experimenting with 
different ways to provide information to citizens, 
particularly vulnerable persons, we identify several 
key tensions. The first is between the bureaucratic 
model of top-down and generic information and the 
demand for information that is location-specific and 
contextualized to individuals’ needs. The second lies 
in the ongoing difficulty around providing warnings 
that people will act on [21]. With vulnerable groups, 
a challenge for upstream actors is the balance 
between consistent/clear information and targeted/ 
contextualized information—whilst accounting for 
bias against alignment with vulnerability. A third 
tension emerges with the growing convergence of 
actors and parallel increase in complexity of the 
translation process. In these circumstances, divergent 
interpretations may take place [18] and may result in 
outcomes and behavior that is difficult to predict [7]. 
There is a need to better explain how platform-based 
actors fit in this information landscape. While the 
literature has examined platform-based actors, these 
have been predominantly managed by traditional 
actors e.g. the Red Cross [6]. We have shown how 
non-traditional actors are leveraging their platforms 
and subsequent connections to provide information.  
In our study, vulnerable persons were only given 
a voice through the organizational actors. Vulnerable 
groups face an enduring problem of low participation 
due in part to individual differences in the desire to 
be part of a group, low levels of risk awareness, and 
low social capital. Further, it merits mentioning that 
many vulnerable groups do not consistently use 
digital media and complementary research is needed 
to examine the broader range of their information 
practices; thus, the need to trace translation processes 
and flow of second-hand information from social 
media. Future research might usefully:  
(i) Expand studies to account for the co-creation of 
information between vulnerable persons and the 
range of organizational actors.  
(ii) Focus on specific groups to identify 
commonalities and differences across the 
category of vulnerability. 
(iii) Examine the interactions and content in online 
communities used by vulnerable groups, to 
uncover appropriate ways to meet the 
information needs of vulnerable groups. 
(iv) Investigate how upstream and downstream actors 
navigate the transition from generic to specific 
information, considering the role of social media 
and information practices in this process. 
(v) Study the convergence of actors [6, 14] and 
increasing role of technology [8] for addressing 
the concerns of vulnerable persons. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1. Information flows between actors (Note: broken lines emphasize areas of more prominent social 
media use; the wavy blue line represents the role of information brokers). 
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